Sunday, February 13, 2005

Lying to Insurance Companies: The Desire to Deceive among Physicians and the Public

Read the abstract below of the article "Lying to Insurance Companies: The Desire to Deceive among Physicians and the Public" by Rachel M. Werner, G. Caleb Alexander, Angela Fagerlin, Peter A. Ubelin the Fall 2004 issue of The American Journal of Bioethics 4(4):53.


Abstract
"This study examines the public's and physicians' willingness to support deception of insurance companies in order to obtain necessary healthcare services and how this support varies based on perceptions of physicians' time pressures. Based on surveys of 700 prospective jurors and 1617 physicians, the public was more than twice as likely as physicians to sanction deception (26%versus 11%) and half as likely to believe that physicians have adequate time to appeal coverage decisions (22%versus 59%). The odds of public support for deception compared to that of physicians rose from 2.48 to 4.64 after controlling for differences in time perception. These findings highlight the ethical challenge facing physicians and patients in balancing patient advocacy with honesty in the setting of limited societal resources. "


If you were the patient's physician who by professional standards of medical care needed a test or procedure but which required your time taken to make an appeal to an insurance company and you knew that your appeal may be rejected because the findings would not meet the company's requirements, would you take a risk of defrauding the insurance company with false history or physical findings which would make acceptance of the request more likely?
After all, you might rationalize, your doing this for the medical and financial benefit of your patient.

But what if you are a patient with the same scenario. Would you ask your physician to deceive your insurance company for your own benefit?

I will write more about this professional ethical and legal issue later.
..Maurice.

Saturday, February 12, 2005

More on Conflict of Interest: Wearing Two Hats: Clinician and Researcher

For those of my visitors who would like to read more about the ethical conflicts of interest which can occur when the same individual is both a clinician and a clinical investigator, I would recommend reading the article written by KATRINA A. BRAMSTEDT, PhD in
CLEVELAND CLINIC JOURNAL OF MEDICINE VOLUME 71,NUMBER 11 NOVEMBER 2004 titled "A Guide to Informed Consent for Clinician-Investigators". In it she describes the potential conflicts and also provides a guidline to obtain informed consent from the patient-subject. This may help mitigate some of the ethical issues but I think not all of them since it may be difficult for the clinician/investigator to fully divest one responsibility for another. I have excerpted her comments about conflict of the dual role of the physician-investigator below. To read the entire article in pdf format go to Cleveland Clinic Journal of Medicine.



An innate conflict also exists when one person
is both physician and clinical investigator,
especially when subjects are drawn from the
physician’s own pool of patients. In this situation
the physician assumes the dual role of
both caring for patients and performing
research on them, two functions that may
conflict. Several ethical issues may arise as a
result of outlooks of both the physician and
the patient.
Coercion to enroll or stay in a study.
One danger is that a physician may aggressively
recruit research subjects to the point of
coercion and may not fully inform patients of
the study’s risks or other treatment options.
The potential for a problem is especially great
when the sponsors of a study offer financial
bonuses to investigators for rapid enrollment.
In the case of Guckin v Nagle, a surgeon
who also functioned as a clinical investigator
recommended an experimental intervention
as “the best therapeutic alternative” for a
patient’s occasional fecal incontinence. The
patient’s anal sphincter was permanently
damaged when the radiofrequency device
overheated and failed to shut off automatically.
The consent form did not indicate that the
procedure was part of a clinical trial, nor did it
mention alternative treatments. The patient
argued that she was a victim of “therapeutic
misconception,” that is, she believed that the
intervention would directly benefit her based
on the information provided by the surgeon
and the consent form.
In the case of adverse events occurring
during a study, a physician-investigator may
be tempted to choose an intervention that
keeps the individual enrolled rather than one
that is clinically the most appropriate.
Patient confusion about the dual role. A
patient may feel obliged to enroll in a study to
“help” his or her doctor in return for the care
the doctor provides. Patients may also feel that the doctor would not be offering study
participation unless it were safe or to their
benefit.
Patients are especially vulnerable when
they are desperate for treatment or if they
lack health insurance. In such cases they may
seek out research studies as a form of health
care.


..Maurice.

Conflict of Interest on Wearing Two Hats: Clinician and Researcher

I have posted here (Jan 8 2005, Dec 23, 26, 13 2004) about situations where physicians play professionally two roles (wearing “two hats”) and the need to be concerned about the potential conflict of interest this raises. On the blog Respectful lnsolence Orac writes about his experience as a physician and also a scientist in the “two hat” role. The discussion centered about academic and financial issues. I added a comment about another possible conflict of interest between the role as a clinician and a clinical researcher with regard to the relationship to the patient-subject. Obviously, a physician who does purely laboratory research will not experience this conflict. I wrote:



I may have missed it in reading all the text on this topic but isn't a discussion of the "two hat" conflict of interest of the physician/researcher with regard to the issue of the patient's informed understanding the research study yet to be considered here? By being a physician, even not the primary treating physician, doesn’t the patient expect a beneficial treatment from you and not an unknown or ambiguous treatment or no treatment at all within a study that both you and the patient participate?
Also are you not under a professional duty as a physician to provide care and avoiding maleficence. And yet as a researcher, your professional duties in clinical research do not require you to provide any treatment but to try to assure that the results of the study will be meaningful and worth the risks which are to be kept to a minimum. The responsibilities of each role, independently, might be understood by a patient-subject but can the role of those who are wearing "two hats" also be understood and accepted?
..Maurice.

Friday, February 11, 2005

The fMRI Studies:The Ethical Decision Process: Reasoning vs Emotions

I presented to ethicists on a bioethics listserv my last posting about the fMRI study results documenting in neurophysiological terms that ethical decision-making involves emotions to varying degrees in addition to reasoning. I thought my visitors might be interested in reading their responses which follow:


I don't think that these studies present a problem for moral philosophy
or even the rationalist tradition in moral philosophy. Rather, they
demonstrate a misunderstanding of basic moral philosophy on the part of
the researcher. There are two related fundamental flaws, as I see it,
with this study and studies like it, and that is that 1) they are merely
descriptive in nature, whereas most moral philosophy is normative and
2), they misunderstand the basic nature of most moral philosophy they
aim to criticize. This study describes how average people DO evaluate
moral problems...the study says nothing about how moral problems OUGHT
to be evaluated. If we want to focus on the rationalist tradition, Kant
would be the standard bearer, and he readily admits that most do not
make their moral evaluations based upon reason, but rather inclination,
emotion, etc. Thus, if anything, this study would support Kant's
conjectures about how most people evaluate moral dilemmas, but say
nothing about whether Kant is right regarding how moral dilemmas should
be evaluated. Put another way, if a similar study were done using fMRIs
of those same study subjects regarding the evaluation of the results of
fMRIs, I suspect we would see an entirely different result than if we
performed the same tests on the researchers. In my own case, I imagine
you would get the fMRI equivalent of crickets chirping...very little
activity at all. Does that mean that the evaluation of fMRIs is done in
the areas of the brain associated with blank stares, crickets chirping,
and the evaluation of Jackson Pollock paintings (in my case, sorry, I
just don't get them!)? Of course not. These studies make a gigantic
leap from is to ought, without even attempting to provide us an account
for why that leap is justified...at least Hume offered an account.




Many people explain that they make moral decisions based on a "gut feeling"
or
instinct. In Aristotelian terms, we would say that the individual, at some
point, used reason to determine the proper action in a particular situation.
Over time, the same choice was made and eventually it became a habit, what
the
person terms a gut feeling. Biologically, the first few times one encounters
a
dilemma, that choice would take place in the reasoning part of the brain,
but
after a while, once it becomes habit and gut feeling, then its processing
would take place in the more emotion-centered parts of the brain.




For a good account of decision making based on reasoning vs "gut feeling",
an excellent read is the best-seller "Blink" by Malcolm Gladwell. He outlines
how many judgments are made quickly, using "thin-slices" of experience, in
which the reasoning process occurs, but does so out of the awareness of the
judgment-maker.



Very few ethicists have thought that ethics is wholly contained in the
activity of "pure reason." I think, rather, that there is a widespread
idea that, first, only creatures capable of reason can be moral agents,
and second, that the practice of ethics is a quintessentially rational
activity, characterized by the production and criticism of reasons
either for or against various courses of action. Ethics seems to involve
a sort of judgment which answers to reason. Nobody should be surprised
if strong emotions accompany or are associated with ethical convictions.
What would be surprising is to find that such convictions are impervious
to reasons.


As you can see by the comments above, the role of emotions in moral judgment is not unexpected by these professionals. Though confirming the role of emotions in judgment, I am not sure what these fMRI studies do to advance the understanding of the judgment process. Are there any congnitive neurophysiologists out there to respond? ..Maurice.

Wednesday, February 9, 2005

Watch Out! A fMRI is Watching You!

As a segue from the topic of the last posting, I would like to write about research into the neurophysiology of the various decisions and pronouncements made by ethicists themselves. And I really don’t see ethicists talking or writing about this yet. Using fMRI technique and with the background of knowledge regarding functional to anatomic correlations of brain processing, information is being developed about how people make ethical/moral decisions from a neurophysiological point of view.



For example, here is an abstract of a Sept. 14 2001 paper in Science titled

"An fMRI Investigation of Emotional Engagement in Moral Judgment " by

Joshua D. Gree et al.:"The long-standing rationalist tradition in moral psychology emphasizes the role of reason in moral judgment. A more recent trend places increased emphasis on emotion. Although both reason and emotion are likely to play important roles in moral judgment, relatively little is known about their neural correlates, the nature of their interaction, and the factors that modulate their respective behavioral influences in the context of moral judgment. In two functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) studies using moral dilemmas as probes, we apply the methods of cognitive neuroscience to the study of moral judgment. We argue that moral dilemmas vary systematically in the extent to which they engage emotional processing and that these variations in emotional engagement influence moral judgment. These results may shed light on some puzzling patterns in moral judgment observed by contemporary philosophers."



I have presented this only as an example of what is currently going on in neurophysiology regarding ethical decision-making. I pose these questions to ethicists or anyone making ethical/moral decisions (which virtually all of us do): What do you think about it? Do you feel uncomfortable about these scientists scrutinizing you? Do you think that the outcome of studies such as the one exampled here will be useful? Will it cause us to be more cautious regarding accepting ethical principles or the results of ethical decision-making? Will fMRIs be used, for example, to separate those ethicists who excessively use their emotions to form their conclusions? A lot of questions.. but I would be most interested in your answers. After all.. it is all about YOU and all of you. ..Maurice.



Tuesday, February 8, 2005

New Neurologic Study: What is its Medical and Ethical Significance?

Read this science article in today's issue of the New York Times. It describes a study published in the current February 2005 issue of the journal Neurology. The study involved testing for metabolic brain activity using MRI imaging on two men who had traumatic brain injury and were in a "minimally conscious state"(MCS)(1) and comparing the responses to various stimuli with normal men and women. What was found was that there was evidence, on exposure to a recording of a familiar voice speaking, of patterns of metabolic activity in the temporal lobes of the traumatized patients that was similar to those of the normal subjects. By the anatomical location, the study suggested that there was active processing of language there possibly similar in some respects to normals. It is not clear what this all means but the New York Times article provides quotes from specialists who wonder if patients in MCS might be able to hear those who speak to them and may have some understanding though they may not be able to express what they hear. Also the experts wonder if this kind of MRI study technique may lead to more definitive diagnosis of the degree of neurologic impairment present beyond simple observation of behavior. The New York Times article relates the comments of the experts: " But they said the study did open a window on a world that has been neglected by medical inquiry. 'This is an extremely important work, for that reason alone,' said Dr. James Bernat, a professor of neurology at Dartmouth.



Dr. Bernat said findings from studies like these would be relevant to cases like that of Terri Schiavo, a Florida woman with brain damage who has been kept alive for years against her husband's wishes. In that case, which drew the attention of Gov. Jeb Bush and the Legislature, relatives of Ms. Schiavo disagreed about her condition, and a brain-imaging test - once it has been standardized - could help determine whether brain damage has extinguished awareness."



Unfortunately, it is not clear by the current research study whether the activity seen on MRI does tell, if any, how much and what quality of awareness is present.

In relation to the Schiavo case, a patient clinically disgnosed as in a permanent vegetative state (PVS)(2), the study did not involve PVS patients. Therefore what immediate consequences this report has on this case is unknown. However, since much of the significance of this study is unknown and there is no current treatment to reverse the anatomic and functional damage in PVS or MCS, it is my opinion that this will not change the ethical decision based on substituted judgment and supported by the courts in that case. ..Maurice.



1. Minimally Conscious States: Patients in minimally conscious states posses sleep-wake cycles and limited, inconsistent but definite awareness of self and environment (e.g., avoiding unpleasant stimuli, uttering intelligible sounds or reaching for objects in a way that adjusts for their size and location)



2.Vegetative States: The Multi-Society Task Force on Persistent Vegetative State (PVS), which included representatives from many of America’s most prestigious neurology associations, has defined the vegetative state as a condition of complete unawareness of self and environment, accompanied by sleep-wake cycles and either total or partial preservation of areas of the brain controlling automatic functions like heart activity and reflexes. PVS patients may cry or smile but these actions are reflexive and do not reflect true awareness.



Monday, February 7, 2005

My Blastocyst Poem

I think what is ignored in all the discussion about personhood for a blastocyst is the need for the proper culture media to grow and develop to make use of that alleged personhood. Well, I thought I might express it in a simple little poem--which I wrote.





“Home Grown”



by Maurice Bernstein, M.D.





I wish

that blastocyst

in the Petri dish

was my son or daughter.



I know

that blastocyst

can’t grow

without a home called mother.





..Maurice.